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SUMMARY 
This paper describes a new method for the analysis and optimization of reliability as an integrated 
part of the design process of electronic circuits. It bases itself on the analysis of the susceptibility of 
failure mechanisms in components as a function of the combinations of external stress factors (stressor- 
sets). The paper describes the backgrounds of stressor-susceptibility analysis, the need for this analysis 
and the way this method is used for high-level design and optimization of electronic circuits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At present industry shows a strong demand for qual- 
ity and reliability to be built in to the design process 
of electronic circuits. Owing to the strong demands 
on throughput and time to market profitability there 
is a strong need for both short design times and 
high levels of quality and reliability. Therefore, an 
(often traditional) design cycle where quality and 
reliability are tested or inspected into a product is 
no longer feasible. Nevertheless, in practice most 
design cycles still show this traditional approach. 
Figure 1 shows the number of design changes as 
a function of the design process. Not only external 
studies,’ but also our own observations show for 
many design processes that, generally speaking, 
roughly the same number of design changes takes 
place after the design release of a product as before 
the design release. It is obvious that early design 
changes have the advantage of a much greater flexi- 
bility for the designer (less is fixed) as well as less 
cost due to the changes. Early design changes can 
be introduced by means of a pencil mark; late design 
changes, especially after commercial release of a 
product, will require changes in a running pro- 
duction process or, even worse, at the customer. 
Therefore it will be necessary to  optimize quality 
Figure 1. Number of design changes as a function of the design 
processes 
and reliability already early in the design process. 
This paper describes 
(a) basic problems that will relate to field quality 
(b) traditional methods that are commonly used 
and reliability problems 
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to approach these problems and why they do 
not work 
a translation from the basic problems to 
‘designable parameters’ 
possible ways to implement this translation 
into design methods (hardware experiments, 
computer simulation) 
computer-aided quality and reliability simul- 
ation. 
BACKGROUNDS OF RELIABILITY 
PROBLEMS 
In order to prevent late design changes it will be 
necessary to derive the backgrounds of especially 
the changes late in the design process. Generally 
speaking it is possible to define three main causes: 
(i) changes due to a mismatch between expected 
functionality and achieved functionality 
(ii) changes due to a mismatch between expected 
reliability and achieved reliability 
(iii) changes due to changed specifications, for 
example due to changed commercial insight/ 
demands. 
As the third aspect is outside the scope of this paper, 
we will concentrate especially on the first two items. 
The two points in time showing a sudden increase 
in design changes correlate with points in time where 
the following information becomes available: 
Design release: a product is produced for the 
first time in higher volumes and applied for 
the first time in larger tests. Differences 
between an ideal product such as specified in 
the design release and (variations in) actual 
production, the material used and the test use 
of the product become apparent. 
Commercial release: a product is produced for 
the first time in high volumes and for the first 
time subjected to the final customer. Differ- 
ences between an ideal product such as speci- 
fied in the design release and (variations in) 
actual production, the material used and the 
actual customer use of the product become 
apparent. 
Although many aspects of quality and reliability are 
very similar in appearance quality and reliability 
problems can be due to a numbcr of different basic 
causes. Examples are: 
1. The product does not fulfil its functional speci- 
2. The product shows physical failures at the 
3. The product does not fulfil its functional speci- 
4. The product shows physical failures after a 
These phenomena can occur both at the level of a 
fications at the moment of delivery. 
moment of delivery. 
fications after a certain period of use. 
certain period of use. 
nominal product or on one or more products in a 
large series. For a comprehensive model of quality 
and reliability see Figure 2. From Figure 2 it is 
possible to define all the following aspects of quality 
and reliability as a function of the three basic 
domains given in Table I: 
(a) nominal design functionability 
(b) nominal overstress 
(c) systematic functional drift 
(d) drift towards overstress 
(e) zero hour quality/yield 
(f) zero hour failure probability/yield 
(g) time-dependent functional failure probability 
(h) time-dependent physical failure probability 
Analysis of quality and reliability should therefore 
consider all the basic areas mentioned above. Opti- 
mization requires not only analysis results covering 
the domains mentioned but also a translation to 
domains where the designer has direct or indirect 
influence. As a result an early optimization of 
reliability and quality should at least consider the 
following aspects on a statistical level: analyse and 
optimize, as an integrated part of the design of a 
product, the concept of a product as a function of: 
(a) the design itself 
(b) the material that will be used 
(c) the future production processes 
(d) the expected customer use. 
See also Figure 3. This results in a strong need for 
methods that can be used as integrated part of the 
early design process. 
COMMONLY USED TRADITIONAL 
RELIABILITY METHODS 
One of the best known reliability prediction methods 
is the method of part failure rate prediction. Since 
the early fifties handbooks based on this method 
have been developed to predict the failure rate of 
a circuit or system based on the failure rates of the 
individual components used. Well known hand- 
books are, for example, the MIL-HDBK-217,2 Brit- 
ish Telecom HRD43 and various others. Also, many 
companies have internal reliability prediction hand- 
books, based on the same principle. Basically these 
handbooks describe the expected failure rate of a 
component using the following type of formula: 
where A, is the part failure rate (failuredh), hb is 
the part basic failure rate (via Arhhenius law), re 
is the multiplication factor for the environment used 
(fixed, mobile, etc.) and IL represents other multi- 
plication factors (speed, analogue/digital, etc.). 
These formulae are used under the following 
assumptions: 
1. All components, within the same components 
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Figure 2. Basic aspects of quality and reliability 
Table I. 
Aspect Effect category 
Failures Functionability Physical failures 
Time T = Q  Time dependency 
Statistics Nominal level Statistical level 
~ 
4 t- b 
Influencing factors Domains 




5 .  
6 .  
7. 
8. 
class and the same application class, are 
assumed to have identical failure rates 
(example: all low-power commercial switching 
NPN transistors, used in a ground mobile 
environment at the same temperature, within 
their specifications, have the same predicted 
failure rate). 
Effects due to differences between components 
within a class are not taken into account. 
Effects due to manufacturing differences of 
components are not taken into account. 
Components within an application are assumed 
to be, to a large extent, independent. 
Components do not mutually influence each 
other provided that they remain within speci- 
fication limits. 
Components do not change properties with 
time (exception: electromechanical com- 
ponents). 
Components are only subject to random fail- 
ures (constant failure rate model). 
Degradation mechanisms in components are 
predominantly of a thermo-chemical nature. 
9. The use of a system is assumed to be constant, 
time independent and depending on the 
environment class only. 
Practical use of these methods show that differences 
between predicted failure rate and actual failure 
rate of several orders of magnitude, both too high 
and too low, are found in pra~t ice .~  
Another difficulty is that the methods used pro- 
vide little relation to designable parameters; in most 
cases the only aspect that is of use for designers is 
the component’s temperature. The effect, however, 
of extreme temperature derating remains in many 
cases within the earlier mentioned uncertainty of 
the prediction  result^.^ 
Therefore, the main use of the traditional parts- 
count reliability prediction methods mentioned 
remains in the comparison of classes of systems 
using certain classes of components. 
For a more detailed analysis/prediction of the 
reliability of a circuit or system new methods have 
been de~eloped .~  These methods base themselves 
on the analysis of physical failure mechanisms in 
components. The analysis in these methods is based 
on the susceptibility of failure mechanisms in indi- 
vidual components to (combinations of) stress fac- 
tors or stressors. Using this method it is possible to 
analyse reliability at the level of single circuits, tak- 
ing into account 
(a) dynamic stresses 
(b) differences in stress due to component toler- 
ances 
(c) differences in stress due to tolerances in com- 
ponent susceptibility 
As a result this method will not only cover a constant 
failure period but also failures in the early life of a 
circuit as well as wear-out failures. The next para- 
graphs will describe the mathematical basis of 
stressor/susceptibility analysis and will describe how 
this method can be used to link low-level physical 
failure mechanisms to the level of ‘designable para- 
meters’; parameters where a circuit designer has 
direct influence to optimize reliability. 
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A TRANSLATION FROM BASIC PROBLEMS 
TO ‘DESIGNABLE PARAMETERS’ 
The lowest, physical, level to consider failures in 
electronic components is the level of failure mechan- 
isms. At this moment considerable research is car- 
ried out to better describe and understand these 
failure mechanisms. Although the various failure 
mechanisms are often very different in nature it is 
possible to generalize most failure mechanisms to a 
common mathematical description. 
In this paper we will assume that all failure mech- 
anisms are influenced by (comhinations of) stress 
factors or stressors. The combination of all non- 
redundant parameters influencing a single failure 
mechanism is called the stressor set* of this failure 
mechanism. A stressor set is the comprehensive 
description of all combinations of parameters influ- 
encing a failure mechanism. 
The probability of activation of a certain failure 
mechanism is not only determined by the stressor 
set of this mechanism. Two comparable devices, 
subjected to the same stressor set can have different 
failure probabilities due to different susceptibilities 
to this stressor set. Mathematically susceptibility is 
defined as the probability that a device, under a 
given stressor set, will fail within a given interval 
of time (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Stressor/susceptihilil y interaction 
Using this concept it is possihle to describe very 
different failure mechanisms in one single concept. 
The only requirement is a model, describing the 
susceptibility of a failure mechanism in relation to 
the associated stressors. 
SINGLE EXAMPLE OF STRESSOR/ 
SUSCEPTIBILITY INTERACTION 
Step 2. Deriving the stressors for the failure 
mechanism( s) . 
Step 3. Deriving the susceptibility of the failure 
mechanism( s) . 
Step 4. Deriving the stressor probability density 
function. 
Step 5. Deriving the probability of stressor/ 
susceptibility interaction for the failure 
mechanism( s). 
Step 6. Translating failure mechanisms to 
‘designable parameters’ and optimizing 
the design. 
The following sections will describe the individual 
steps in detail. 
Step 1. Deriving the failure mechanisms in a 
component 
The first step in stressor/susceptibility analysis is, 
normally, deriving all (potential) failure mechan- 
isms in a component. For a fuse the most obvious 
(in this case even deliberate) failure mechanism is 
the burn-out of the fuse wire (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Failure mechanism in a fuse 
Step 2.  Deriving the stressors for the failure 
mechanism( s )  
The next step in the analysis is determining what 
stressors can activate the failure mechanism, men- 
tioned above. For the failure mechanism mentioned 
in the example the main reason for activation will 
be the temperature of the wire. Although it is valid 
to consider the wire temperature as a stressor, usu- 
ally it is useful to decompose stressors down to the 
level of basic stressor; stressors that cannot be 
further decomposed completely into other basic 
stressors. A valid set of basic stressors for this failure 
mechanism could be as shown in Table II.* 
An example of a simple failure mechanism is, for 
example, current breakdown i n  a fuse. Stressor/ 
susceptibility is usually performed using six steps: Failure mechanism Stressors 
Table 11. 
Step 1. Deriving the failure mechanisms in a com- F~~~ burnout Current Ambient temperature 
ponent . 
* The authors are aware of the fact that the real stressor set for 
a fuse is much more complex. This example is intended only to 
show an example of stressorlsusceptibility interaction. 
* Stressor sets can consist of stressors such as voltages, tempera- 
tures, etc. 
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Step 3. Deriving the susceptibility of the failure 
mechanism( s )  
The third step in stressor/susceptibility analysis is 
to derive from the physical failure mechanism a 
susceptibility model. Such a model describes the 
probability of failure as a function of the mentioned 
stressor set. 
In the case of the bum-out of the metal wire in 
a fuse the probability of failure depends on the 
probability that a hot spot in the wire reaches a 
temperature where the wire actually melts. There- 
fore it will be necessary to determine the tempera- 
ture of (a hot spot in) the wire as a function of the 
stressor set (see Figure 6). 
Assuming that this hypothetical material immedi- 
ately melts at the moment a (hot-spot) temperature 
of 600 K is exceeded it is possible to derive a failure 
probability function as a function of the stressors. 
ZYU 
T amb ( K )  250 
I 0 200-600 600-1000] 
Figure 6. Fuse hot spot temperature as function of stressor set 
Step 4. Deriving the stressor probability density 
function 
The probability of failure of a certain device not 
only depends on the susceptibility of the failure 
mechanism but also on the (statistical) behaviour 
of the stressor set. Therefore it will be necessary 
to derive, based on the time dependent transient 
behaviour of the stressor sets so-called stressor prob- 
ability density functions (see Figure 7). 
A stressor probability density function models the 
(correlated) behaviour of a stressor set using prob- 
ability density functions. The stressor probability 
density function models the relative probability of 
occurrence of a certain combination of stressors in 
a given interval of time. 
A stressor probability density function is derived 
using the following steps: 
1. A stressor, in the form of a time-signal, is 
derived from simulation (or from hardware 
measurements). 
2. The stressor time-function is sampled in order 
to obtain the relative frequency of occurrence 
of the various stressor values. 
3. From this frequency of occurrence function the 
discrete probability density function is derived. 
4. The discrete probability density function is 
used to obtain an approximate continuous 
probability density function. 
A stressor probability density function models the 
(correlated) behaviour of a stressor set using prob- 
ability density functions. The stressor probability 
20 &I.. . . . . . . . . * a * .  . . . *I . 
Time Frequency of occurence \ \ 
n ;  I 
Current(A): - 
Current (A) 
Figure 7. Translating time signals to stressor probability density functions 
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density function models the relative probability of 
occurrence of a certain combination of stressors in 
a given interval of time. 
Step 5. Deriving the probability of 
stressorlsusceptibility interaction for the failure 
mechanism( s )  
In the fifth step both the stressor probability den- 
sity function and the susceptibility function are used: 
(a) to derive areas where interaction or overlap 
between the stressor probability function and 
the susceptibility function can occur 
(b) to derive the probability of a failure occurring 
due to that overlap in a given interval of time 
(see Figure 8). 












Figure 8. Stressor/susceptibility interaction 
Owing to functional component tolerances the 
stressor set can, in many cases, show variations in 
a batch of circuits. In the same way, due to toler- 
ances in material properties, a susceptibility function 
can show tolerances in a batch of circuits (see 
Figure 9). 
Also both the stressor set and the susceptibility 
function can change with time (drift and wear-out). 
These tolerances and time shifts can be used to 
explain the well known bath-tub curve and recently 
observed deviations from the bath-tub curve (roller 
coaster curve) (see Figure 
Using stressor/susceptibility analysis it is possible 
to decompose the roller coaster curve into four dif- 
ferent areas (see Figure 11): 
1. Early failures. Failures at or shortly after t = 0: 
products delivered with either increased stres- 
sors (due to e.g. material tolerances or toler- 




both). Owing to the increased stressor/suscep- 
tibility interaction there is a largely increased 
probability of failures at or shortly after t = 0. 
Early wear-out. (Early) failures shortly after 
t = 0: similar to 1; products delivered with 
either increased stressors (due to e.g. material 
tolerances or tolerances in use) or increased 
susceptibility (or both). Owing to the increased 
stressor/susceptibility interaction there is not 
the immediate danger of failure but a largely 
increased probability of accelerated degra- 
dation. After a certain time interval this degra- 
dation (the increasing of susceptibility due to 
wear-out or increasing of stressors due to 
drift) this may lead to a form of stressor/sus- 
ceptibility interaction where there is in a cer- 
tain time-interval a largely increased prob- 
ability of failures (the hump in the failure rate 
curve). 
Stable system. At the moment all subpopula- 
tions with either increased stressor/suscep- 
tibility interaction or increased degradation 
within a (large) batch of products have died 
out. At a certain moment in time there will 
remain a population with a fairly homogeneous 
stressorlsusceptibility interaction. This will 
result in a failure probability which is to a 
certain extent constant in time. Quite often 
the stressor probability density function is, in 
this interval, governed by external random 
effects such as lightning, mains transients etc. 
Systematic wear-out. Basically this part of the 
curve shows a strong similarity to the second 
part of the curve (early wear-out). In this case 
(long-term) degradation and (long-term) drift 
cause increased probability of stressor/suscep- 
tibility interaction. The population of 
(remaining) products is, at this interval in time 
quite homogeneous (see also the section on 
stable systems). 
At present susceptibility models are available for 
the following failure mechanisms: 
1. Instantaneous failure mechanisms: 
(a) current breakdown 
(b) power breakdown 
(c) various forms of voltage breakdown 
(d) forward bias second breakdown 
(e) reverse bias second breakdown. 
2. Gradual failure mechanisms: 
(a) corrosion 
(b) electromigration 
(c) secondary diffusion. 
3. Special modelling of susceptibility for stressor 
sets due to 
(a) electromagnetical interference 
(b) electrostatic discharge. 
Further susceptibility models are at this moment 
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Figure 10. Roller coaster curve 
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Figure 11. Relation between the rolleraaster curve and stressor-susceptibility interaction 
under development in the CAIRO research project. 
In the CAIRO research project Twente University 
in Enschede (NL), Philips Consumer Electronics in 
Eindhoven (NL) and Imperial College in London 
(UK) co-operate on the development of a system 
for computer-aided integrated rcliability optimiz- 
ation (CAIRO). 
The primary goal of this research project is not 
to refine and improve basic research on failure 
mechanisms themselves but to bring the failure 
mechanisms into one common system using stressor/ 
susceptibility models. 
This is because of the fact that many designers 
of circuits and designers of the systems where the 
circuits are used will have no time available to con- 
sider every single component. The most important 
points for a designer will be 
1. Are any failure mechanisms in a circuit or 
system activated? 
2. If yes: with what probability? 
3. With what parameters at the (circuit/system) 
designer level is it possible to influence/ 
optimize the probability of activation of the 
failure mechanism mentioned'? 
The problem is that, generally speaking, every com- 
ponent has more than one failure mechanism; every 
failure mechanism and every stressor can be 
influenced by many designable parameters (see 
Figure 12). 
Figure 12. Need for a relation from stressor/susceptibility analy- 
sis to designable parameters at various levels 
Step 6.  Translating failure mechanisms to 
'designable parameters' and optimizing the design 
One of the methods of solving a multi-parameter 
problem is by means of the setting up of hardware 
experiments. Commonly used techniques for this 
purpose are 
(a) Taguchi experiments1 
(b) Shainin experiments5 
(c) traditional design of experiments. 
There is, however, a problem in analysing, for exam- 
ple, complex structures such as integrated circuits. 
At the moment actual hardware, in this case proto- 
type silicon, is available the design is, most times, 
fixed to such an extent that major design changes 
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are in many cases not practical. An alternative for 
hardware experiments can be found in computer 
simulation. 
A simulation system for computer-aided quality 
and reliability simulation should fulfil the following 
requirements: 
The system should be able to perform stressorl 
susceptibility analysis on all major failure 
mechanisms in electronic components on the 
level of major (integrated) circuits. 
The system should derive from the mentioned 
analysis results components/structures/devices 
with increased failure probability. 
The system should derive for the devices with 
increased failure probability all related para- 
meters, at the level of the circuit design, the 
production processes, the material and cus- 
tomer use. 
Where parameters are designable (mainly in 
the circuit design but in some cases also in the 
process design) the system should give guide- 
lines for optimization of the product towards 
robustness. 
Using computer simulation for stressor/suscep- 
tibility analysis it is possible to determine the prob- 
ability of failure of a certain failure mechanism in 
a given component. As mentioned in the previous 
sections, for a designer it will also be important to 
analyse what parameters in his design dominantly 
influence the probability of failure of the (dominant) 
failure mechanisms. 
Therefore for every parameter in a design the 
following statistical properties are determined (see 
Figure 13): 
1. The probability density function of parameters 
causing activation of a failure mechanism 
2. The probability density function of parameters 
causing no actuation of this failure mechanism 
These combined probability density functions are 
called pass-fail diagrams6 (see Figures 14 and 15). 
COMPUTER-AIDED QUALITY AND 
RELIABILITY SIMULATION 
At this moment a system using the mentioned 
methods and models is under development within 
the CAIRO project. The system consists of the 
layers shown in Table 111. 
Table 111. Hierarchy in the CAIRO system 
Optimization 
Reliability simulation (Stressodsusceptibility analysis) 
Tolerance sirnulation 
Functional simulation 
Figure 13. Deriving dominant designable parameters relating to 
failure mechanisms 
Functional simulation 
The first level of the CAIRO system consists of 
functional simulation. Many of the stressors relevant 
to the failure mechanisms mentioned earlier can be 
derived from electrical simulation of the network 
description of the circuit. For example the stressors 
relevant to the failure mechanisms mentioned earlier 
are: 
(a) power dissipation 
(b) voltage/electric field 
(c) currentlcurrent density 
(d) (stored) charge 
(e) voltage slope (dVldt) 
(f) current slope (dlldt) 
(g) temperature 
(h) temperature slope (dT/dt) 
Of these aspects only temperature and temperature 
slope cannot be simulated directly. The only prob- 
lem are sometimes the slope parameters U l d t .  
Deriving them using numerical approximation can 
under some circumstances provide problems. 
Another problem can be obtaining accurate func- 
tional models of the components. To derive stressors 
with sufficient accuracy to allow reliability predic- 
tion will sometimes require more detailed models 
than currently a~a i l ab le .~  
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Figure 14. Pass-fail diagram showing high sensitivity 
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Figure 15. Pass-fail diagram showing low sensitivity 
Tolerance simulation 
As mentioned earlier one of the key reasons for 
design changes late in the design process are 
observed differences between the designed nominal 
product and the actual product produced or used in 
high volumes. Therefore a realistic prediction of 
reliability for a high-volume product will not only 
require simulation of an ideal product used under 
ideal user conditions but will also require analysis 
of the expected variability of the expected stressor 
susceptibility interaction. 
Reliability simulation (stressorlsusceptibility 
analysis) 
This layer uses the tolerance simulation derived 
earlier to derive stressor sets relevant to failure 
mechanisms in the components used. It is important 
that the system has possibilities not only to simulate 
effects of nominal stressor probability density func- 
tions and nominal susceptibility functions for the 
failure mechanisms but also to simulate the effects 
of both tolerances in stressor sets and tolerances in 
component susceptibility parameters. 
Optimization 
The top layer of the CAIRO system is used to 
identify all parameters with a high impact on the 
probability of activation of the mentioned failure 
mechanism. This information is used to propose a 
new set of component parameters which should give 
a decreased probability of failures. 
CONCLUSIONS (WHERE ARE WE NOW?) 
At this moment the CAIRO system has been under 
development during the last five years; three years 
to develop the methods described in this paper and 
two years of actual implementation. At this moment 
it is possible to analyse and optimize reliability of 
circuits using the following failure mechanisms: 
1. Instantaneous failure mechanisms 
(a) current breakdown 
(b) power breakdown 
(c) various forms of voltage breakdown 
(d) forward bias second breakdown 
(e) reverse bias second breakdown. 
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2. Gradual failure mechanisms 
(a) corrosion 
(b) electromigration 
(c) secondary diffusion. 
3. Special modelling of susceptibility for stressor 
sets due to 
(a) electromagnetic interference 
(b) electrostatic discharge. 
In many cases, however, the system is still in an 
experimental phase; see Table IV. 
Table IV. 
Tools Models Parameters 




Reliability R R R 
Tolerance O ( + )  O(- )  O(- -) 
Functional W++) O(+)  O(*)  
R: available at the research level 
0: available at the operational level 
- -: not available 
-: generally not available 
C: often available 
+: in most cases available 
+ + : available 
Although still in an experimental phase, computer 
simulation has given us already in several pilot pro- 
jects a very good possibility of analysing at an early 
phase of the development process quality and 
reliability aspects of integrated circuits as well as 
circuits using discrete components. 
For the near future the research will concentrate 
on the translation of results of research on compon- 
ent failure mechanisms into susceptibility models as 
well as on the adaptation of the simulation system 
to derive the related stressor sets. 
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